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
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
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AN ABSTRACT

OF

Mr. LOCKE's ESSAY

ON

Human Understanding.

By the Rt. Hon. Sir JEFFREY GILBERT, Knt.
Late Lord Chief Baron of his Majesty's Court of Exchequer in
Ireland, and afterwards of that in England.



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
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TO THE
D U B L I N Edition.

IT would be superfluous to add any Thing to recommend the following Abstract of Mr. LOCKE's celebrated Essay on Human Understanding, after I have assured my Readers, that it was drawn up by no less a Man than the late Lord Chief Baron GILBERT.





A B S T R A C T

O F

Mr. LOCKE's Essay on Human Understanding.



EN come into the World without any Idea or Principle, either speculative or practical; but all our Ideas arise either from Sensation or Reflection.

An Idea is whatsoever is perceived or thought on; and is either,

I. S I M P L E.

II. C O M P L E X.

A

I.

I. A SIMPLE IDEA is one uniform Appearance, Representation, or Perception of the Mind, without Alteration or Variety. Here three Things are to be considered :

First, The Manner of their Conveyance, or being in the Mind.

Secondly, The Objects from without that affect the Mind.

Thirdly, The Mind itself.

First, The Manner of their Conveyance into the Mind : Some simple Ideas come in by Sensation only ; some by Reflection only ; some both by Sensation and Reflection.

1. By Sensation only ; and these either by the Sensation of one Sense, as Light and Colour, by the Eye ; Sound, by the Ear ; Taste, by the Palate

Palate; Odours, by the Nose; and the Ideas of Solidity, and other tangible Qualities, as Heat, Cold, &c. by the Touch: Or of several Senses, as the Ideas of Motion and Rest, Space, Extension, and Figure.

2. By Reflection only; as Perception or Thinking, Volition or Willing, and their several Modes.

3. Simple Ideas, both by Sensation and Reflection; and these are either Pain, Pleasure, Existence, or Unity.

Secondly, Objects from without that affect the Mind; and they are,

1. Primary Qualities of Bodies; such as Motion, Rest, Figure, and Texture, which are in the Bodies themselves, whether perceived or not.

2. The several Dispositions in Bodies to produce several Sensations in us ; whence Colours, Sounds, Tastes, &c. which are indeed only Sensations produced in the Animal, by the Operation or Action of such primary Qualities.

Thirdly, The Mind itself ; and therein are three Faculties :

1st, Of *Perception*.

2dly, Of *Retention* ; which is twofold :

1. Either the keeping the same Ideas actually in View ; which we call Contemplation. Or,

2. Reviving them when they are gone ; which we call Memory.

3dly,

3dly, Of *Discernment*; which contains a threefold Power:

1. Of comparing the several Ideas, and, on such Comparison, observing their Resemblances; which is called Wit: Or observing their minutest Differences; which is called Judgment.

2. The Power of compounding our Ideas; which is, 1. By carrying several simple Ideas into the same Representation: Or, 2. By the Repetition of the same Idea; which is called Enlarging.

3. The Power of abstracting; which is the separating any Idea from the Circumstances of real Existence; as from Time, Place, and other concomitant Ideas.

II. COMPLEX IDEAS consist of several simple Ideas, united in the same Representation, Appearance, or Perception; and they either come into the Mind, thus united, from the Operation of Things without us; as the Idea, Solidity and Figure, is caused by the same Ball; therefore, in the Complex Idea of the Ball, we conceive such Ideas as co-existent and concomitant: Or else when such Simple Ideas are united by the Mind; as in the Idea of Law, Obligation, &c.

Complex Ideas are of three Sorts:

First, Of Modes.

Secondly, Substances.

Thirdly, Relations.

First,

First, Of Modes; which are again twofold:

1st, Simple.

2dly, Mix'd.

1st, Simple Modes are the several different Manners under which any Simple Idea may appear to the Mind: And these either come in,

1. By Sensation only, as the several Modes of Space, a Yard, a Furlong, a Mile: Or set out by visible Marks and Boundaries; as the several Places of Bodies, or the several Modes of Numbers, as a Score, a Gross, a Dozen.

2. By Reflection only; as the several Modes of Thinking, which are either,

(1.) With-

(1.) Without Pain or Pleasure.

(2.) Or with it.

(1.) Without Pain or Pleasure ; and whoever observes his Mind, will find a perpetual Revolution of Ideas while he is awake. The stopping any of them, and considering it on all Sides, we call Attention. The letting the Mind run adrift, in the constant Rotation of Ideas and Objects before us, is called Remission ; and there are in the Mind constant Degrees of Attention and Remission, according to the different Degrees of Consideration the Mind employs concerning the Objects before it.

(2.) The Modes of Thinking with Pleasure and Pain ; and these are called the Passions. The Pleasure we find in any Idea, present and absent,

absent, we call Love. The Pleasure we find in the Thought of any future Enjoyment, that we think probable to affect us, we call Hope. The Pleasure we find upon the near Approach of any Pleasure, of whose Possession we think ourselves assured, we call Joy. Whatsoever does, or is like to affect us with Pleasure, we call Good. The Thought of Pain, which any Thing, present or absent, is apt to produce in us, we call Hatred or Aversion. The Uneasiness we find upon the Absence of any Thing that might affect us with Pleasure, we call Desire. The Uneasiness of Mind upon a Good lost, which we might have longer enjoyed, we call Sorrow. The Uneasiness of Mind, upon Thought of future Pain, we call Fear. The Uneasiness of Mind on the Thought

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of a Good we Desire, obtained by another, we call Envy: If such Good relates to the Enjoyment of Men and Women, it is called Jealousy. A sudden Uneasiness of Mind, on a sudden Pain produced in us by another, together with a certain Purpose to produce Pain in return, is called Anger; if constant, and the Purpose of returning Pain be continuing, it is called Malice. The Uneasiness that arrives from the Thought of any unattainable Good, we call Despair. Whatsoever causes Pain, or is like to produce it in us, is called Bad or Evil.

3. Simple Modes, coming in by Sensation and Reflection: Hence we have the Ideas,

(1.) Of Power.

(2.) Of Time.

(3.) Of

(3.) Of Eternity.

(4.) Of Infinity.

(1.) The Idea of Power; which is formed from the Ability that we find in ourselves of stopping any Idea, in the Revolution of any Ideas within us; or the Power, by a Thought, of moving our Bodies, which is called the Will. The Power of Acting, or not acting, according to such Determination of a Man's own Thought, is called Liberty: So that Liberty is the Absence of all Impediments that hinder acting or not acting, according to the Preference of his own Will. That which moves the Will, is Uneasiness; but such Motions may be controuled by the Power we have within us of omitting any Action, till we have considered its Consequences, and find them either good

or evil. That wherein consists Innocence, is the acting or not acting, according as the Judgment, upon a due and impartial Consideration, doth find such Act or Omission to be good or evil: And the not suspending such Action, till we have considered it as we might do, is called Guilt.

The Idea of Power from Sensation is, when there is any Alteration in our simple Ideas, by the Action of Bodies one upon another; that Body which makes the Alteration, we conceive to have the Power of making it, and the other a Power of receiving it.

(2.) Of Time; which is a certain Revolution of Ideas in our own Mind, measured by the Motion of Things without, and chiefly by the Mo-

Motion of the heavenly Bodies, as being more constant than equal.

(3.) Eternity is the Repetition of such several Revolutions, together with a Reflection on our own Power to add on, without coming to an End.

(4.) Infinity is the same Repetition of our Ideas of Space or Number, with a Reflection on our Power to add on, without coming to an End ; and such Repetition of our Idea of Space, is, by a peculiar Name, called Immensity.

2dly, Of mix'd Modes ; which are several distinct simple Ideas, united into the same Combination by the Mind, and are therefore called Notions ; as a Lye, Obligation, Law, &c. And these the Mind unites

nites for greater Dispatch in the Business of Civil Life; and therefore only considers the possible Union of such simple Ideas, whether it has ever seen them so actually united, or not.

Secondly, The Ideas of Substances; and these are either,

1st, Separate. Or,

2dly, Collective.

1st, Separate Substances; and that is the Union or Co-existence of several simple Ideas in one and the same Place; which is all the Notion we have of Substance. Thus the Union of the Idea of Extension, Solidity, Figure, and a Disposition to produce the Idea of Colour in us, is what we call Body. The Union or Co-existence of the Ideas of Perception,

ception, Reflecting, Chusing, and Self-motion, is what we call Spirit: But what are the *Substrata* of these Properties and Powers, are to us equally unintelligible.

2dly, The collective Ideas of Substances, which is when several Substances are collected into the same Representation; as an Army, Triumph, Procession, &c.

Thirdly, Of Relations; which is the comparing of several Ideas, whether simple, or of Modes and Substances, one with the other, and considering the Denominations that may arise from such Comparison: For since the Order of Nature is such, that there is a Dependence of Things, one upon the other; so do they convey to the Mind an Idea of such Dependence: And whatever Notion

we

we have from such Dependence of Things one on the other, or of the Connection or Repugnances of Ideas one to the other, gives us the Idea of Relation.

All Words that refer to a certain Standard, either of Duration or Size, are relative Terms; as old, young, strong, weak, &c. which relate to the usual Duration or Constitution of each living Creature, as the Standard to which we compare the Thing mentioned. The most noted Relations are these :

1st, Of Cause and Effect.

2dly, Identity and Diversity.

3dly, Moral Relations.

4thly, The Relations of our Ideas themselves.

1st,

1st, Of Cause and Effect: That which produces any simple Idea in us, we call Cause; and that which is produced, we call the Effect.

2^{dly}, Of Identity and Diversity. And here the Identity of Bodies arises from the Sameness of the Parts, which produce the same simple Ideas in the Beholder. The Identity of Vegetables arises from the same Organization of the Parts, whether exactly consisting of the same Matter or not. Identity of Animals consists in the same Organization of Parts, and the same constant and continued common Life; and that Life consists in the same Faculties and Power of acting. And the Identity of Person, Mind, or Spirit consists, as far as we can apprehend it, in having the same Consciousness of Ideas, Powers, and Actions.

C

3^{dly},

3dly, Of Moral Relations. The Notion of which arises from our comparing our Actions to a Rule; and that is threefold:

1. The Laws of the Country.
2. The Laws of Opinion, or Reputation.
3. The Law of God; which is twofold:

(1.) The Law of Nature; which is the Rule which Reason discovers to us touching the Fitness or Convenience of any Action.

(2.) The Law revealed.

4thly, The Relations of our Ideas themselves; and they relate either,

1. To the Perception of our own Minds.
2. To

2. To the Things they are supposed to represent.

3. Of the casual Relations of such Ideas one to another, obtained in the Mind.

1. Of Ideas relating to the Perception of our own Mind: And they are said to be either,

(1.) Clear. Or,

(2.) Confused.

(1.) A clear Idea is that wherein the Mind perceives a Difference from all others.

(2.) A confused Idea is such as is not sufficiently distinguishable from other Ideas different from it.

2. Of Ideas relating to Things they are supposed to represent; and they are,

(1.) Real or fantastical.

(2.) Adequate and inadequate.

(3.) True and false.

(1.) Of real or fantastical Ideas.

All our simple Ideas are real, being produced by the Operation of Things in us. Mix'd Modes are all real, being a Combination made by the Mind; if the Co-existence of such Ideas be only possible. The Ideas of Substances are real, if we have ever found such simple Ideas come into our Mind so united; if otherwise, they are fantastical.

(2.) Of adequate and inadequate Ideas. Adequate Ideas are such as per-

perfectly represent those Archetypes, or Patterns, to which the Mind refers. Inadequate Ideas are a partial and incompleat Representation of such Patterns. All simple Ideas are adequate. All mix'd Modes are adequate, because they refer to no Archetypes, or Patterns; but only to a certain Combination made by the Mind: But so far they may be inadequate as they refer to a supposed Combination, made in the Minds of other Persons, signified under the same Name. All Ideas of Substances are inadequate, because they have Reference to Patterns, whose real Essence we know not.

(3.) Of true and false Ideas: Ideas are said to be true, that are conformable to some real Existence; and false, that have no Conformity to such Existence any where found,
And

And so our Ideas are said to be true, when they are conformable to the Ideas signified under the same Name by others.

3. Of casual Relations of such Ideas one to another, obtained in the Mind. And this is by Custom: As the putting together of Ideas, according to their apparent or probable Agreement or Disagreement, is Reasoning; and the connecting repugnant Ideas, is Madness: So the connecting independent Ideas by Custom, which have no visible Connection in themselves, is an Infirmity in the Mind that wants a Name; as where a Man has the Imagination of an infallible Man by Education and Custom: These, and such like false Associations of Ideas, by Habit and Custom, make a perpetual Connection between them in the Mind;

Mind; so that they perpetually appear together in the same Gang, and as much affect our Reasonings, Opinions, and Judgment, as if they were naturally united.

Of L A N G U A G E.

Men were not created to live solitary, and independently on each other, as several Kinds of Brutes do; but for mutual Intercourse and Society; and therefore it was not enough for Nature to furnish the Mind with Objects from without, which are invisible in the Mind; but it was also necessary that we should be furnished with a ready Method of communicating such Ideas; and this was by the Sense of Hearing, whereby we are capable of receiving several Sounds, and connecting of them with the Ideas in the

the Mind ; and farther are, by the Tongue, capable of making such Sounds as Signs of such Ideas. So that Language is nothing else but the Connection of such Sounds to Ideas, in order to make the Ideas in the Mind of one Man understood by another. But because several Objects excite in us the same Ideas, therefore Names in Language are made general, to excite in the Hearer such an Idea as is framed in the Mind of the Speaker, from whatsoever particular Object such Idea was formed in the Mind of the Speaker; for in connecting the Sound of the Idea, the Mind hath no farther Consideration than of the Idea itself, as it stands in the Mind of the Speaker, by whatsoever Thing from without it was formed in him : And were it otherwise, it were impossible to register

gister the Particularity of Things, and accommodate Names to them; since scarce any Man hath the same Idea from the same particular Object, which another has. Besides that, if Names were as particular as Things, such Signs would become altogether useless; since the Particularity of Things are infinite, and therefore would incumber the Mind with infinite Names which could not be remembered, nor would be of Use for Intercourse and Communication.

In Language four Things are considerable :

First, The Expression of independent Ideas.

Secondly, The Expression of the Connection and Repugnancy of Ideas.

D

Thirdly,

Thirdly, The Imperfections of Language.

Fourthly, The Abuse of it.

First, Of the Expression of independent Ideas; and that is three-fold:

1st, Of simple Ideas.

2dly, The Names of mix'd Modes.

3dly, The Names of Substances.

*1st, Of Simple Ideas; which cannot be defined or explained *per notiora*, since Definition is resolving the Thing to be defined into its most simple Ideas: But complex Ideas may be defined, because they may be resolved into their simple Ideas: And simple Modes may be defined, being the Manner in which these simple*

simple Ideas are combined; and therefore the Mind may define such precise Combination.

2dly, The Names of mix'd Modes: And they being arbitrarily made in the Mind, for the Ends of Civil Life, and Names added to them for Dispatch in Conversation, we may define the particular Combination of which they consist; and being made without any Relation to Archetypes without, it is the Name that holds together the Combination.

3dly, The Names of Substances: And here the Name stands for the precise Collection of simple Ideas in the Mind of the Speaker; which is the nominal Essence, tho' it has a Relation to something without, capable of raising that precise Collection of Ideas in the Mind, which

D 2 are

are the Patterns or Archetypes of such nominal Essence : But the real Essence, which is the internal Constitution of Parts, on which such Properties depend, is perfectly unknown, and therefore not express in the Name.

Secondly, The Expression of the Connection and Repugnancy of Ideas ; and this is three Ways :

1st, By inventing Words of Affirmation and Negation, to be Signs of the Expression of such Connection and Repugnancy.

2dly, By the Invention of abstract and concrete Terms.

The abstract Term, or Substantive, is the Sign of an Idea independent on any other.

The

The concrete Term, or Adjective, is the Expression of the Idea, with the Relation of its Co-existence with others.

3dly, By the Invention of Particles, which are Signs that connect the Train of Ideas one to another, that they may be received into the Mind of the Hearer in the same Order in which they stand in the Mind of the Speaker.

Thirdly, Of the Imperfection of Language. And here,

1st, Of simple Ideas: And there the Connection is made between the Name and the Idea, by shewing the Object which exhibits it; and therefore here we are not very liable to mistake, since these Ideas are regularly produced from Things without, and

and therefore the same Ideas are formed in all Men, having the same Organs ; and there is no Difference between the Archetypes and the Idea, the Object without regularly creating that Idea in the Animal, to which the Name is annexed.

2dly, The Names of mix'd Modes are often subject to Perplexity and Confusion, when there is great Variety in the same Combination ; so that the simple Ideas of which the Name consists, cannot be remembered, and because we cannot go to Archetypes to correct their Mistakes about them.

3dly, The Names of Substances are liable to great Imperfections, because we know not the real Constitution of Things ; and therefore cannot understand what precise Com-

Combination of simple Ideas is co-existent, which have all the same Right to be made a Part of the nominal Essence.

Fourthly, The Abuse of Words.

1st, By using Words without Ideas.

2dly, By varying the Combination of Ideas, and keeping the same Name; by referring Words to the Reality of Things, and not to our own Ideas; by putting together such Ideas in our Minds as united in Things without us, as have not come in co-existent.

The Remedy of these Abuses is, by defining the precise Combination of Ideas to which the Name is annex'd, and using the Words invariably

bly for the same Combination of Ideas.

Having thus considered our Ideas, which are the Materials of our Knowledge and our Language, which is the Manner of our conveying them to others, the last Thing is to consider how our Ideas are put together, and compared one with the other: And herein,

First, Of Knowledge and Opinion.

Secondly, Of Reason and Error.

Thirdly, Of Faith and Enthusiasm.

First, Of Knowledge. Knowledge is the comparing of two or more Ideas, and viewing their Connection and Agreement, Repugnancy

cy or Disagreement; and it is two-fold:

1st, Either Intuitive; or,

2^{dly}, Demonstrative.

1st, Intuitive Knowledge is where the Agreement or Repugnancy of several Ideas appears upon View.

2^{dly}, Demonstrative Knowledge is where the Agreement or Repugnancy of Ideas doth not appear upon View, but by Comparison with some intermediate Idea. Thus we demonstrate that all the Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right, by setting the Triangle between Parallels, and comparing the Angles at the upper Point of Intersection with the Angles of the Triangle, and two right Angles.

The Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas, is of four Sorts :

1st, Of Identity or Diversity.

2^{dly}, Relation.

3^{dly}, Co-existence.

4^{thly}, Real Existence.

1st, Identity or Diversity is known by Intuition, as we know by View that one Colour or Magnitude is not another.

2^{dly}, The Ideas of *Relation* are known from View or Demonstration, as in the Instance before-mentioned.

3^{dly}, Co-existence, or Non-co-existence is seldom known from the general Comparison of our Ideas; for since we do not know the real Sub-

Substances of Things, we do not know what Ideas are compatible with each other; and therefore here we have no Knowledge from the general Consideration of our Ideas, but from Trial, Observation, and Experience only.

4thly, Real Existence: And here we have Knowledge,

1. Of ourselves, by Intuition or View.

2. Of the Being of a God, by Demonstration: As thus; The Absence of Being cannot produce Being; *ergo*, something eternal. Absence of Thought cannot produce Thought: We think; *ergo*, there is Thought without Beginning. Eternal Thought we call God. We begin to think; *ergo*, not from Matter, where there

is no Thought; *ergo*, the Mind created by eternal Thought. And whatever could produce a Being to see and feel, must be presumed, as a less Effect of his Power, to produce the Things felt and visible.

3. We have the Knowledge of the Being of all other Things by Sensation.

Having thus considered the Objects of our Knowledge, the next Things to be considered are,

First, The Extent.

Secondly, The Reality. And

Thirdly, The Universality of our Knowledge.

First, The Extent of our Knowledge; and that is,

1st,

1st, No farther than we have Ideas. And,

2^{dly}, No farther than we can find their Agreement or Disagreement, by the comparing them with intermediate Ideas, by which their Agreement or Disagreement may appear.

Secondly, The Reality of our Knowledge. And tho' our Knowledge be only of Ideas, yet these Ideas having Relation to Objects without us, it is in some Measure real; for all simple Modes being the Product of the Operation of Things themselves upon our own Minds, all our Knowledge about them must be real Knowledge. Mix'd Modes are intended to have Relation to Ideas in our own Minds; and therefore our Knowledge concerning them has no other Reality, but upon the Supposition

position of the Existence of such Modes, conformable to our Ideas. Our Knowledge of Substances are so far real, as we put together Ideas co-existent in the same Place, and that have come into our Minds thus united; but as far as we refer them to the real internal Constitution of Things, so far our Ideas of Substances are not real, because their Constitutions are unknown to us. Truth therefore in the Mind is the inward Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas, together with a like Perception of the past, present, or future Existence of the Things themselves so conjoined or separated in Nature. In this Definition of Truth is comprehended a twofold Certainty: A Certainty of Knowledge; which is the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement

ment of our own Ideas : A Certainty of Existence ; which is a Perception of the Things themselves existing, conjoin'd, or separate, as we have put them together : Truth in Words is the conjoining the Signs of the Ideas together, as the Ideas themselves lie in the Mind of the Speaker.

Thirdly, Of the Universality of our Knowledge. In simple Ideas, where the real and nominal Essence is the same, there all our Knowledge is general and universal, because there is no Difference in these Ideas, from whatsoever Objects they are formed. In mix'd Modes our Knowledge is general and universal ; for these being Combinations made by the Mind, not with Relation to an actual, but only a possible Existence, all our Knowledge concerning them

is

is universal; since the same Agree, or Disagreement must happen where, ever they are found.

Our Knowledge of Substances, as far as relates to their real Essence, is all particular, since it goes no farther than our Trial and Observation, which is only particular touching the Bodies before us; but not knowing the real and internal Constitution of Things, we cannot rank them into any general Sorts, or Classes, under general Names, and therefore we are not capable of any universal Knowledge about them. For to make universal Propositions, it is necessary that we should know the absolute set Bounds of each particular Thing that we comprehend under that general Name; and that we cannot know without looking into the internal Constitution of Things, which in

in this State and Condition we can-
not do: But touching the nominal
Essence of Substances, we may make
universal Propositions; but these are
only identical and trifling, and signi-
fify no more than the several Ideas
we comprehend under that Name;
as when we say Gold is yellow, fu-
sible, fix'd, &c. that the Whole is
equal to all its Parts taken together;
as that whatsoever is, is; and that
it is impossible for the same Thing
to be and not to be. These three
last, however, they have got the
Reputation of Maxims, are nothing
else but identical Propositions; includ-
ing what we comprehend under the
Name of Whole or Being, as the
other comprehends what we include
in the Name or Term of Gold; by
consequence such Maxims are of
little Use to the Invention of Know-

For the ledge,

ledge, but may serve for the effectual Conviction of such as wrangle or oppose.

2dly, Opinion is the Perception of the probable Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas. Probability is where the Connection or Agreement, or the Repugnancy or Disagreement, is not found from the Intuition or View of the Ideas themselves, or from the Intuition of any Idea to which they are compared, which, by such intermediate View, shews such Connection or Repugnancy ; but such Agreement or Disagreement is found by Observation and Experience only, which could not be found from any View or Juxtaposition of the Ideas themselves in our Minds : Thus we know that our Meat nourishes, not from any general Ideas of the internal Constitution of

of Meat, and of the Animal, but because we have found it to be true from Experience only. But here we must consider,

1. The several Criterions or Marks of Probability arising from our own Experience.

2. From the Experience of others.

1. The several Criterions or Marks of Probability arising from our own Experience.

(1.) When such Experience is general and universal, we no more doubt of such Truths than of those that appear from the Intuition of the Ideas themselves, because such Experience furnishes the Mind with a constant Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of such Ideas,

as if it had risen from the Intuition of the Ideas themselves.

(2.) If such Experience hath fail'd in single Instances, then the Agreement or Disagreement of such Ideas is judged from the Number of such Instances, one Way or the other, that have fallen under our Experience; for then we esteem such Ideas to agree or disagree one with the other, as we have generally found to do so; but every Instance to the contrary is the Occasion of some Doubt to the Mind.

Hence it is, that what may seem probable to one Man, or in some Places, seems improbable in others, according to the Difference of their Observation and Experience: As that Water should be hard enough in Winter to bear Carts and Horses, may

may seem probable in *England* and *Holland*; but would not seem probable *under the Line*, where they were never used to such Observations.

All our Knowledge touching Substances goes no farther than Probability, because we have no Ideas of the internal Constitution of such Substances to compare with each other; and therefore our Reasonings, touching the Co-existence or Non-co-existence of such Ideas, is founded,

(1.) Upon the Trial and Experience of such their Co-existence.

(2.) Upon Analogy; whereby, upon the Observation of the Co-existence of like Ideas, we judge that where such like Ideas are found, there will follow the same Ideas, which

which, at other Times, we have found consequent upon them.

2. The several Criterions or Marks of Probability, arising from the Experience of others.

As we judge by our own Experience, so also we judge by the Sight, Observation, and Experience of others; and this is called Testimony. And in this eight Things are considerable:

(1.) The Number.

(2.) The Integrity.

(3.) The Skill of the Witnesses.

(4.) Their true Design and Intent.

(5.)

(5.) The Consistency of the Parts and Circumstances of the Relation.

(6.) Contrary Testimonies.

(7.) The Consistence of what is attested with our own Observation and Experience. And

(8.) The Distance of such Relators from the Sight and View of the Thing which they attest; which is so far weakened as they themselves take it from others, and the Thing related doth not fall under their own View or Experience.

These are the Criterions of Probability, touching Facts depending on mere human Agents: But in Things depending on the Power of God, the seventh Criterion of Probability is not to be taken into our weighing

weighing and considering such Facts; because our Observation and Experience extends no farther than the ordinary Course of Nature, and not to what God Almighty can do in an extraordinary Manner; for the Confirmation of Doctrines of great Importance, and which he hath thought fit to reveal.

Secondly, Of Reason; which is that Faculty in Men, whereby we discover the Connection or Repugnancy of our Ideas in themselves, or their probable Connection or Repugnancy one to the other.

Thirdly, Error; this arises from the casual Association of Ideas, by Habit or Custom, or by Education from our Minority, otherwise than such Ideas are conjoined or separated in Nature, or by depending blindly on the Authority

thority of others, without perceiving the Connection of such our Ideas, or the probable Connection of them; and yet conjoining and separating them according to such Authority, where there is no Connection or Repugnance in the Ideas themselves; forming Propositions in Things of which we have no Idea, by Comparison of them with the Ideas we have; concluding without intermediate Proofs, or without sufficient Consideration of them.

5thly, Of Faith. Faith is the Belief of any Truth coming from God, the Author of Truth: And this is either,

1. By original Revelation. Or,
2. Traditional.

1. Original Revelation is the immediate Delivery of Truth from God Almighty into the Minds of Men, which is done in a Manner to us unconceivable ; for how God Almighty may deliver himself in Ways different from the common Conveyance of Knowledge, by Sensation or Reflection, is not by us to be understood, we having no other Ways of Knowledge ; but that it may be done is extremely probable, from the Consideration of his infinite Power.

2. Traditional Revelation is the Belief of a Truth coming from God, without immediate Revelation to ourselves, upon the Testimony of Facts which must of Necessity proceed from the Power of God.

(1.) Such Things revealed cannot be contrary to Reason ; because it

it were absurd to suppose that God Almighty should dictate one Thing in the ordinary Course of Nature, and another by such extraordinary Revelation; nor could such a Revelation be believed, since the Truth of its coming from God could not be more evident, than the Connection or Repugnance of the Ideas themselves are in their own Nature.

(2.) Such Revelation is of Things above Reason; that is, of such Things of which Reason is altogether silent; for such Revelation were to no Purpose, if it taught nothing at all farther than what might be found by the Use of our natural Faculties; tho' it may enforce such Things as are found to be Truths by our natural Faculties from Considerations which could never be found out by them; and as far as it doth so,
it

It is above and beyond what Reason can decide.

5th, ~~Eccl~~ is an Opinion
in our own Fancies and Imagina-
tions or Revelations from God.
~~but then~~

1. If such Revelations come, by ex-
~~ter~~ ~~ter~~ Extraordinary Effects coming from God,
the Devil to be pretended Revela-
tions, & Men not fit at Liberty
within them, will believe them or
not.

2. If such Revelation be con-
trary to Reason, or contrary to for-
mer Revelations attested by Facts
coming from God, such Revelation
cannot be from God, because God
cannot be the Author of Contra-
dictions.

3. If

3. If such pretended Revelation contain nothing more than what Reason teaches, or what has been already taught by a former Revelation attested by the divine Power, then such Revelation cannot be from God, unless it be attested by Facts flowing from the same Power; since we cannot suppose that to be done by God in a worse and less evident Manner, which hath been done in a better and more apparent Manner already.

F I N I S.



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